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When we want to focus on worldwide wireless
connection through WMNs it is obvious the size of the
mesh backbone is huge. In our proposed model (zonebased network model [10]) we addressed the scalability
[9] issue by partitioning the Mesh Backbone/ Backbone
networks/ Backbone routers (Fig.2) into different strata
or segment or group depending upon the geographical
region such that it makes each stratum relatively
independent. Here Ri s are the different
strata/region/group for all i=1 (1) p.

Abstract— Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is an upcoming
wireless network technology and is mainly used to provide
broadband internet in remote locations. It is characterized by
minimum fixed infrastructure requirement and is operated in an
open medium, such that any user within the range covered by mesh
routers may access the network. So a critical requirement for the
security in WMN is the authentication of users. However, WMN is
far from mature for large-scale deployment in some applications
due to the lack of the satisfactory guarantees on security. A wellperformed security framework for WMN will contribute to network
survivability and strongly support the network growth or reduction.
A key management model to overcome the scalability issue on
security aspect for large-scale deployment of WMN i.e. Worldwide
WMN is proposed in this work, which aims to guarantee wellperformed key management services and protection from potential
attacks. Here, we use a combination of techniques, such as zonebased topology structure, off-line CA, virtual certification authority
) etc.
Index Terms—WWMNs, PKG, Strata, DSR

I. INTRODUCTION
Fig.1 describes a typical infrastructure of a WMN
model. Now with the future large-scale deployment of
worldwide wireless connection, group communication
is a very important pattern in WMNs [1, 2]. Securing
group communication in dynamic and large-scale
groups is more complex than securing one-to-one
communications due to the inherent scalability [9]
issues of group key management.

Fig.2: Zone-based Wireless Mesh Network model.

II. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN WMNS:
There are many security issues in WMNs viz. Secure
Routing, Secure Location information, Authentication
& key management etc. Due to the fundamental
importance, we have initially focused on
Authentication & key management with the expected
outcome of a low-computational and scalable key
management framework with well-performed security
functions and protection from potential attacks. After
that we have extended our concept over WWMNs.
A. Authentication & key management:
In wireless networks, authentication is very important
because of the shared nature of the wireless medium.
Any node, legitimate or malicious, with a suitable
hardware device can send data into the network.

Fig. 1: A typical infrastructure of WAN
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Verifying that the data received is from a legitimate
entity is critical for securing the network. In this aspect,
the public key infrastructure (PKI) [7] and certification
authority (CA) provide two important mechanisms for
authentication.

B. Distributed CA:
A distributed CA scheme will be used instead of
centralized CA to utilize the applications of PKI which
is the most common practice in key management.
Distributed CA distributes the functionality of the
centralized CA to the whole network by applying
threshold cryptography [4] which has been proved
efficient and well-performed.

Authentication is usually realized by implementing PKI
based on asymmetric cryptography in which each user
has a pair of cryptographic keys: public key and private
key. The public key is widely distributed and known by
all the users while the private key is only secretly kept
by the user. One property of the pair of keys is that a
message encrypted with the public key can only be
decrypted with the corresponding private key and vice
versa. By exploiting this, authentication can be
achieved. For instance, a sender can digitally sign the
packets using its own private key before sending them.
If the receiver can successfully decrypt the messages
with the sender’s public key, it is assured that the
packets are really sent by the claimed sender rather that
someone else.

C: Scalability and Security Issue on WWMNs:
In this work, we are trying to consider the scalability
issue along with the security issue on WWMNs [9],
where the ‘Scalability’ is a desirable property of a
system, a network, or a process, which indicates its
ability to either handle growing amounts of work in a
graceful manner, or to be readily enlarged [5].
III. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND NECESSARY
COMPUTATION:
Before assigning an authorized certificate and an
authorized key to a user, the system completes the
following initialization steps:
(a) Every region/strata/group R1, R2,…….,Rp has a
centralized CA, say CC1, CC2, ………, CCp, say
Combiner-checker [8, which are the special type of
routers, have the ability of two types of
communication viz. wireless and wired.
(b) Within the region/zone it (CCi) acts as wireless but
among
the
regions
they
have
wired
communication.
(c) The every CA creates two pairs of private and
public keys, one for itself and the other one for the
regional system using some (may be RSA)
algorithm. The public key for the ith regional
system is denoted as Ki and its corresponding
private key as Pi.

So, to check the validity of a digital signature, it is
necessary to first verify that the sender’s public key
does belong to the sender, which requires a Certificate
Authority (CA) be involved in the authentication
procedure. The CA signs the binding of an entity’s
identity and its public key with its private key, and
issues the signature as the entity’s certificate. Any
entity can validate the binding of sender’s identity and
public key by checking its certificate using CA’s public
key. A node may update its certificate periodically to
reduce the chance of brute-force attack on its private
key. So the CA has to stay on-line to reflect the
periodically changing certificates. This scheme is based
on the following assumptions:
•
the CA’s public key is known by every entity
in the network,
•
the CA’s public key and signed certificates
are globally trusted in the network, and
• the communication channels through which
the entities get other’s certificate from CA are
secure.
However, the absence of pre-established trusted
network infrastructure in WMNs obstructs direct
application of PKI. This is because it is impractical to
deploy a CA that every node can trust and establish a
secure communication channel with. A distributed CA
scheme is thus required.

(d) Before accessing a regional/stratum network, every
terminal user must register with
its CA. If a
terminal user wants to serve as a regional/stratum
router, the terminal user must submit an application
to the CA of that region besides its user
information. If the terminal user is approved of
being a backbone or regional router, the CA would
confirm it as a backbone or regional router. Every
user broadcasts its user ID to all other users.
(e) Ni be the total no. of backbone routers in the ith
region/strata/group such that
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p
N
∑ Ni = N - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(1),(k) S 2 = 1 ∑i (Y - Y N ) 2 , i = 1(1)p - - - - - - - - - -(5),
i
i=1
i
Ni -1 j=1 ij
where N is the total no. of backbone routers in the
is the population mean square of the ith stratum.
networks.
th
(f) ni is the no. of backbone routers selected from the (l) ythij= value (distance) of the j selected router of the
i stratum.
ith segment/region/strata, such that

p
∑ n i = n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(2 ),
i =1

(m) y n Mean distance of the selected router from the
i
ith stratum.

where n is the total no. of selected routers from all
the strata.
(g) Every regional CA would select ni terminal routers
from ith region with suitable procedure, viz. BRij,
for all i=1(1)p and j=1(1)ni, which serve as private
key generation (PKG) nodes within the
region/strata/group. But [6] described this BRij as
“higher performance” routers which have almost
no significance to construct the PKG. These ni
backbone routers would then form a virtual CA of
the ith region and manage the keys using the (xi,
ni)- threshold cryptographic method [8]. That is,
the CA publishes the public key Ki of that region to
all of its users while the private key Pi of that
pieces
region
is
partitioned
into
ni
Pi , Pi ,..........., Pi and assigns the ni pieces to
ni
1 2
the ni different backbone routers. Any ti out of the
ni backbone routers could reconstruct the private
key Pi. Therefore, any mi out of the ni backbone
routers cannot reconstruct private key Pi unless mi≥
xi.
There must be a proper procedure to define the size
of the PKG. In this work we mainly concentrated
on this size selection process.
(h) Yij s are the physical distance between jth router of
ith strata/group and its CA (CCi), for all i=1(1)p
and j=1(1)Ni.
N
1 i
(i) Y N =
∑ Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3),
Ni j=1 ij
i

1

n

i

2
(n) si 2 =
∑ (y - y n ) , i = 1(1)p - - - - - - - - - - - -(6),
i
n i -1 j=1 ij
is the mean square distance of the selected unit
from ith stratum.

(o) Estimate of the population mean ( Y N ) from
selected sample using:
1 p
yst =
∑ N y n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (7),
N i=1 i i
2
S
1 p
Ni (Ni - n i ) i - - - - - - - - - - - -(8),
∑
2
ni
N i=1
and its estimate is given by
p N2 s2
Est(var(yst )) = ∑ i . i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(9).
i=1 N 2 n
i

(p) var(yst ) =

Thus it may be observed from Equ.(9) that
2
Est(var(yst )) depends on si i.e. how far the samples
are deviated from its mean distance within the
2
segment/region/strata. Thus, if si , are small then the

var(yst ) is small and hence the total time to distribute
the CA’s information to its distributed/virtual CAs is
small.

mean distance in the ith stratum.
Another important observation is that var(yst ) is
1
1 p
(j) Y N = ∑ ∑ Yij = ∑ Ni Y Ni - - - - - - - - - - - - - (4),
also depending on ni, size of the selected sample from
N i j
N i=1
the
ith segment/region/strata and hence we are
mean distance of the whole backbone network.
concentrated on selection process of the different value
of ni for different segment.

International Journal Communication & Network Security (IJCNS), Volume-I, Issue-II, 2011

9

Group-Key Management Model for Worldwide Wireless Mesh Networks

IV. SELECTION PROCESS AND ITS OPTIMIZATION:

p
ψ = var(yst ) + λ( ∑ ti ni - T + a) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (13),
i=1

A. Proportional Selection:
Scalability (network being adaptable and expandable)
problem can be solved by ‘Proportional selection’
process,
n i ∞N i ,

Unconditionally for variation in ni and λ being
Lagrange’s multiplier.
Substituting the value of var(yst ) from (8) we have

i.e. if Ni increases then ni must be increased. Here we
can say that if N increases/decreases over time, then we
have to increase/decrease n as desire, so as to
n
= constant(c), and hence
N
n
n
i
N = c = N - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (10),
i

2
p
Si
1 p
ψ=
N i (N i - n i )
+ λ( ∑ t i n i - T + a) - - - - - -(14).
∑
2
i=1
ni
N i=1

Differentiating ψ partially w.r.t. ni and equating to
zero, we get for an extremum
NiSi
ni =
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (15).
N ti λ
Summing both sides of (15) over i from 1 to p, we get

B. Periodic Selection & its Optimization:
In our above describe selection process there is no
concept of time constraint. Here we want to introduce a
new selection process which includes the time
constraint. Let us assume that, refresh the selection
process after every T time-unit, so that the scalability
issue can be overcome in real life scenario.

the

λ and substituting this value in Equ.(15) we get

nN S / t i
ni = p i i
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (16).
∑ [N iSi / t i ]
i=1
Thus, in optimum selection for a fixed time
NS
n i ∞ i i − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (17).
ti

So here we introduce the “Stratified” selection process.
Let, the time function T in this stratified selection has
the following form
p
T = a + ∑ t i n i - - - - - - - - - - - - - (11),
i=1

where ‘a’ is a constant and ‘ti’ is the average time
required to select per unit in the ith
segment/group/stratum for all i=1(1)p.

From Equ.(17), the following conclusions can be made:
A large sample (the value of ni) would be required from
a group if
• Segment/group/stratum size(Ni) is large,
• Segment/group/stratum variability(Si) is
large,
• Time requires for selecting every unit is low
in the group.

So our problem converts to as below:
“We have to select the value of nis from different
segment after every T time-unit interval such that

var(yst ) is minimum and hence precision will be
maximum i.e. time required to distribute the CAs
information to its distributed/virtual CAs is minimum”.

From equation (16), it can be observed that ni is given
in terms of n. The value of n depends upon whether the
sample is elected so as to meet a specified total time T.

Hence we have to minimize var(yst ) subject to the
condition
p
∑ t i n i = T - a - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (12).
i=1

For a fixed time T, substituting from equation (16) in
time function equation (11), the optimum total sample
size n is given by

Eventually we have to minimize
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p
(T - a) ∑ (N iSi / t i )
i=1
n=
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (18).
p
∑ N iSi t i
i=1

N. Accordingly the new value of total selected sample
routers nnew (calculate using Equ.(18)), is also obviously
less than n. And now we can calculate the values of ni s
of the selected regions using either Equ.(16) or
Equ.(19). The ni backbone routers would form a virtual
CA and manage the keys using the (xi, ni)-threshold
cryptographic method [8] for every selected ith region
separately as discussed previously.

In particular if ti = t0, ∀ i=1 (1) p, then we have the
following consequences:
NS
n i = n p i i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(19).
∑ NS
i=1 i i

a. Proposed Authentication algorithm
for WWMNs:
Let us consider our example as in Fig. 3 i.e.
communication takes place between client A of region
Ri and client B of region Rj through the regions Ri , R5,
R6, R2, R3, Rj and the corresponding algorithm as given
below:

Hence the optimum value of ni, is in Equ.16 or in
Equ.19 and by using it, maximize the required
precision.

Assume all the public keys of CCi s are known to each
other for all i=1(1)p.

V. WORLDWIDE ISSUE.
In particular, the high computation overhead for key
establishment and key renewing i.e. selecting
distributed CAs is usually relevant to the group size and
consequently becomes a performance bottleneck in
achieving scalability [2] for Worldwide WMN.
According to our model we can thrash this issue as
below:

BEGIN
Step I:

Set FLAGA = 0.

Step I.I: Message ‘mA’ containing A’s identity, its
public key, its regional ID, the ID of the
destination region and the destination client and
signed by xi no. of nodes/ virtual CAs and
generate xi no. of partial signatures as
PS(m A , Pi ), PS(m A , Pi ), - - - - - - -, PS(m A , Pi ) .
ni
1
2
Forward these partial signatures to the regional CA,
called ‘combiner-checker’ [8] ‘CCi’ and generates
the certificate CRi. Now ‘CCi’ checks whether CRi is
the same as it is signed by CA’s private key Pi. So,
‘CCi’ actually checking whether any xi out of ni
backbone routers virtual CAs could reconstruct the
private key Pi (Fig. 4).

A: Different Regions/ Strata selection:
Suppose client A of region Ri want to communicate
with client B of region Rj (Fig. 3). According to some
routing protocol (may be DSR or AODV) the selected
path (
) passes through the regions Ri, R5, R6,
R2, R3, Rj for this communication. It is clear from the
Fig. 3 that, we have not incorporated all the regions of
the entire network, we only consider Ri, R5, R6, R2, R3,
Rj regions.

If the above try of ‘CCi’ fails to
Step II:
authenticate then stop the process immediately and
try the process again with another set of xi routers to
construct the CRis .
Step III: This trail-error process continuesτ
times at most for very region/zone.

no. of

Step IV: If any success occurs in Step II or in Step

Fig. 3: Client A communicates with client B

III
Set FLAGA = 1.
Else
Terminates
the
communication
authentication fails i.e. go to END.

B: Application of TC over the proposed model:
Now the new backbone network size, Nnew=total no. of
routers from the selected regions is obviously less than
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• Detecting the communication path using DSR
technique for our proposed ‘zone-based
WWMNs’ algorithm and non-zone-based
WWMNs.

Step V: The CA, CCi’ will construct a message
‘MA’, which contains FLAGA =1 and CRi
and
MA is encrypted with CCi ‘s private key.
Step VI: Now CCi will check whether B is under
it’s region or not?

A: Detecting the value of PKG / virtual CA (ni)
The simulated parameters are listed in Table 1.

Step VII: If the answer of Step VI is false then
Transfer the message ‘MA’ to the next
region’s Combiner-Checker (as CC5 in
our example) and follow the Step VI.
Else if the answer of Step VI is true then
Combiner-Checker asks the destination
client to prove its own authentication
using Step I to
Step IV.

Parameters
No. of regions
Total no. of routers (Ni) /zone
Physical distance of every node
from its CCi
Average time to select a node by
its CCi for each 15 regions
Network refreshment time
Constant value by which
proportional selection is possible

Step VIII: Finally if the ‘Else if’-part in Step VII is
occurs successfully then
The proper authentication (decrypt the MA
using CCi’s public key which is known to CCj
) as well as proper communication has been
established between source and destination
client (Fig. 4).
END.

Times in milliseconds
300000 ms.
0.015

Table1: Simulation parameters for PKG / virtual CA (ni)

At the beginning of the simulation, randomly generate
total no. of routers (Ni) for each region and also
randomly generate the physical distance to each node
from its CCi. Now we conduct this simulation 20 times
consecutively.
Fig.5 represents the 20 pairs of n values (n =∑ni ,
i=1(1)15), which are obtained by simulating using two
diff. methods.

b. Pictorial representation of
authentication process in WWMNs

Fig. 4:

Values
15
Randomly generated and
it is > 8 and < 400
Randomly generated

Pictorial Representation of authentication process in
WWMNs

Fig. 5: No. of nodes selection using "Zone-Based" &
"Proportional" Selection Process

VI. SIMULATION RESULTS

From the simulation it was found that the average PKG
sizes are 54.9, 48.7 for "Zone-Based" & “Proportional"
selection respectively. So, the average gains per
simulation in zone-based over proportional selection is
6.2. In 24 hours 288-times refreshment is required @
5min. interval and hence the group-based selection
selects 6.2*288=1788 less sample than proportional

We have simulated our work in two parts as below
using JAVA and C language:

• Detecting the value of PKG / virtual CA (ni) for
each region using ‘zone-based selection’ and
‘proportional selection’, respectively.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

selection, which is a immense gain in terms of time
constraint as well as mathematical computations.

(a) Now the question is after what time we should reevaluate the sample size ni?
Assume that this process continues τi number of times
for ith region. And also suppose that, the time required
to complete this
number of times, for ith
τi process,
particular
ξ i region is time- unit such that,
ξi ≤ τi x i t i ,

B: Detecting the communication paths using DSR
technique
For this part of simulation the parameters are as in
Table 2.
After all the assignment has made for all the
parameters, simulations have been done for 20 pair of
communicating nodes. Fig.6 shows the no. of hop
counts for two different methods of communication.
Parameters
Values
No. of zones/regions
7
No. of nodes per zones
5,7,6,7,6,7,7
respectively
CCi for each zone
Node E, M, V, Z, p, I,
v respectively
Physical distance among Assign the distance
all CCi s
randomly
‘Radio
range
index Assign it randomly
‘among all nodes zonewise
‘Radio range index ‘ for Assign it randomly
all nodes of the whole
network
Communicating nodes
Take
two
nodes
randomly

i=1(1)2*, where 2* total no. of selected region/zone
where the actual authentication process occur according
to our routing protocol, and hence
2
∑ ξi + δ ≤ T,
i=1

where δ is a constant time required for intermediate
passing .
(b) So in this way it may be concluded that after at
2
most ∑ ξ
+ δ
i= 1

,time-units interval the sample size ni should be reevaluated such that the scalability problem can be
solved.
(c) This sequential authentication process may require
less time to complete than an unorganized process
because it requires less no. of computation works.
(d) The use of time function with minimum variability
in the zone-based selection is essential over the
proportional selection, where there is no concept of
minimization of variance with the time function.
(e) This work only represents the initial effort for the
development of a sophisticated authentication scheme
for Worldwide Wireless Mesh Networks (WWMNs).
This work has been projected a low-computational and
scalable key management model for WWMNs which
aims to guarantee well-performed key management
service and protection from possible attacks.
(f) As the future work towards achieving the ultimate
goal, it is needed to do more quantitative analysis using
a WMN test bed. We will plan to combine our two diff.
simulations process on that test bed.

Table 2: Simulation parameters for path selection

Fig.6:

i

Hop counts between two node communication for 'Zonebased WWMNs' & 'Non Zone-based WWMNs'
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From the simulation results we can calculate the
%coefficient of variation (%CV) for both the
distribution and that are 52.61 and 60.63 for ‘zonebased’ and ‘non zone-based’. So, on-an-average the
gain is 8% in terms of hop counts to communicate
between two randomly chosen nodes.
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